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This thesis  assesses the different  options fo r modernizing Army 
National  Guard l ight  ut i l i ty helicopter  aviat ion assets  for  future roles and 
missions.   I t  wil l  review the pol i t ical  process by which Army National  
Guard aviation structure and modernization are determined. 
The United States mili tary forces are continually deployed to 
various regions of  the world to perform different  missions,  in a  period 
characterized by increasingly austere defense budgets.   A major budgetary 
challenge for  defense planners is  to balance operat ional  costs ,  in terms of  
equipment modernization programs, with operational  capabil i t ies.   The 
pos t-Cold War period, with i ts  potential  for redefining roles and missions,  
continues to evoke situations requiring a thorough and nonpartisan 
examination of mili tary force structure for the United States Army and the 
Army National Guard.  The objective of such an examination should be 
for optimizing force structure throughout the Army, in both active and 
guard units.   Army National Guard aviation,  with i ts  dual federal  and state 
ro le ,  requires a careful  analysis  to determine the optimal force structure 
and modernization strategy that  will  best  suit  the Guard for both roles.  
In brief,  this thesis provides a careful examination of modernization 
and conversion options necessary to evaluate wha t constitutes maximum 
operat ional  and cost  effect iveness with regard to army aviat ion force 
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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
This  thesis  assesses the different options for modernizing Army 
National  Guard l ight  ut i l i ty helicopter  aviat ion assets  for  future roles and 
missions.   I t  wil l  review the pol i t ical  process by which Army National  
Guard aviation structure and modernization are determined. 
The United States mili tary forces are continually deployed to 
various regions of  the world to perform different  missions,  in a  period 
characterized by increasingly austere defense budgets.   A major budgetary 
challenge for  defense planners is  to balance operat ional  costs ,  in terms of 
equipment modernization programs, with operational  capabil i t ies.   The 
pos t-Cold War period, with i ts  potential  for redefining roles and missions,  
continues to evoke situations requiring a thorough and nonpartisan 
examination of military force structure for the United States Army and the 
Army National Guard.  The objective of such an examination should be 
for optimizing force structure throughout the Army, in both active and 
guard units.   Army National Guard aviation,  with i ts  dual  federal  and state 
role,  requires a careful  analysis  to determine the optimal force structure 
and modernization strategy that  will  best  suit  the Guard for both roles.  
In brief,  this thesis provides a careful examination of modernization 
and conversion options necessary to evaluate what constitutes maximum 
operat ional  and cost  effect iveness with regard to army aviat ion force 
structure.    
The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) had l i t t le  direct  
impact on LUH-related decis ions.   Senators  and their  professional  s taff  
did,  however,  let  the Army know what sort  of a modernization plan would 
be acceptable.   For several  years prior  to the introduction of  the Mult i -
function Battalion (MFB) force structure,  Congress had been asking for a 
sound modernization plan from the Army.  The senators’ main crit icism of 
Army plans was that they contained too many costly programs (e.g.,  
 x i i
Comanche) for the available budget.   If  the Army had presented a sound 
plan for the Light Util i ty Helicopter (LUH) structure and airframe design, 
with a detai led just if icat ion of i ts  batt lefield need,  the SASC likely would 
have supported i t .   
Although Department of Defense (DOD) advisory committee 
members historical ly have close t ies to industry and f inance,  research for 
this paper uncovered no  link between advisory committees and the LUH 






This thesis  analyzes the influence of poli t ics  and decision-making 
on the U.S. Army’s force structure developmental process.  The study 
focuses on a s ingle Army aviation force structure decision involving both 
the Army and the Army National Guard (ARNG). A case study will  
analyze the U.S. Army’s Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) program for 
influences impacting the structure’s development and subsequent fielding 
during the 1990s. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The fielding of the LUH structure provides a useful study of 
pol i t ical  inf luence and decis ion-making for  several  reasons.   First ,  there 
are poli t ical  actors in both the state and federal  governments with 
in teres ts  re la ted to the f ielding of aviation force structure.   These include 
congressmen, state poli t icians,  and defense interest  groups to name a few.  
Defense contractors competing for defense modernization funds have an 
interest  in force structure programs as well .  The LUH program both 
competed with and piggybacked on other procurement and modernization 
programs involving Army aviation.  Secondly, the LUH program evolved 
in the post-Cold War period,  where different components of the U.S. 
military establishment continued to vie  for  armed forces roles  and 
missions.   Reduced defense budgets and mili tary downsizing have made 
decisions about modernizing existing combat platforms and the 
procurement of new ones,  including Army util i ty helicopters,  more 
complicated.   Decis ion-makers have had a hard time planning the force 
structure of the Army National Guard, as they struggled to define the 
Guard’s roles and missions as well  as  the mil i tary threat .  
The post-Cold War environment provides a framework in which to 
examine factors affecting force structure decisions that may not have 
existed during the Cold War.   This study identif ies some specific factors 
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that  should be considered in force structure decision-making, specifically 
at  the Army National Guard level.    
B. THE MACRO -LEVEL PROCESS 
The Army has a process by which i t  determines force structure 
requirements .   The thesis  discusses that  process in order  to provide bet ter  
insight into how force development and structure,  such as an aviation 
bat ta l ion or  s imilar  uni t ,  evolves  with guidance derived from the National 
Mili tary Strategy (NMS).   
The Cold War threat ,  which drove our mil i tary decision-making 
processes since the end of World War II ,  no longer exists .  This reduced 
threat  environment has forced civil ian and mili tary leaders to scrutinize 
the U. S.  armed forces’ roles and missions,  and to determine what force 
structure changes,  if  any, are needed to meet possible future threats.    
The peacetime Army tradit ionally has received 22-24 percent of the 
Department of Defense (DOD) budget .  Several  recent  events have caused 
fundamental changes in the size and budget of today’s peacetime army.  
The Army has been downsized to a much smaller force,  in personnel end -
strength, equipment,  and infrastructure,  than it  was during the Cold War.  
The emphasis is on transforming the Army from a threat-based Cold War 
force  into  a  capabi l i t ies-based force for the future.  Defense budget 
reductions and increased troop deployments make the transit ion a 
challenging task.   Within the last  decade,  we saw a 300 percent  increase 
in troop deployments and a corresponding 35 percent decrease in the 
Army’s size.  Our forces are now engaging in a wide array of challenging 
missions,  and in more places than before.   The difficult  task has been to 
balance such competing requirements as current  operat ional  readiness and 
future readiness in an environment of constrained resources.   Future 
readiness depends on modernization of priori ty weapons systems and 
other Army programs.  The draw down of the Army during the last decade 
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corresponded with a budget reduction of more than 40 percent. 1  This has 
had an impact on numerous modernization goals and corresponding 
programs including util i ty helicopter procurement of the UH -60 and other 
force options for the LUH.  Army aviation accepted r isk in the near- term 
by deferring uti l i ty helicopter modernization in favor of modernizing 
attack helicopter assets through the procurement of the RAH-66 
Comanche and funding for an Apache Longbow upgrade package. Since 
the Cold War ended in 1991, the Department of Defense has been under 
intense pressure from Congress and the White House to reduce 
expenditures.   This has translated into delayed plans for modernizing the 
Army with the latest high- tech equipment.   Meanwhile the Army, forced 
to uti l ize existing combat platforms and equipment,  opted for short- term, 
lower cost  upgrades in l ieu of modernized ones.   Army aviation currently 
is  operat ing tact ical  hel icopters  beyond their  or iginal ly expected service 
l i fe . 2  
Increases in deployment OPTEMPO for the Army dictated the need 
for greater  readiness,  thus priori t izing funds for operations and training.   
The increased pace of these operations put a higher than anticipated strain 
on the useful l ife expectancy of Army equipment,  resulting in a greater 
need for  recapital izat ion.   The increased OPTEMPO also created a greater  
demand for modernization of Army systems and equipment. In all,  funding 
reductions have left  a major gap between Army aviation’s modernization,  
and new force structure plans for the tw enty- first century. 3 
                                                 
1 E d w a r d  G .  A n d e r s o n ,  a n d  M i c h a e l  L i n i c k ,  “ E n s u r i n g  F u t u r e  V i c t o r i e s  T h r o u g h  L a n d  P o w e r  
D o m i n a n c e :  T h e  U . S .  A r m y  M o d e r n i z a t i o n  S t r a t e g y , ”  i n  M i l i t a r y  S t r a t e g y  a n d  F o r c e  P l a n n i n g ,  p p .  
513- 517 .  
2 “ B u t  C a n  I t  W i n  a  B u d g e t  W a r ? ”  A r m e d  F o r c e s  J o u r n a l  I n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  A p r i l  9 4 ,  p p .  3 6 - 39 .  
3 A n d e r s o n  a n d  L i n i c k ,  p .  5 1 5 .  
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C. OVERVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS. 
The composition of the Army and the Army National Guard force 
structure is  not completely within the purview of the Army.  Force 
structure determination begins with the National Mili tary Strategy that 
describes the s trategic environment ,  sets  object ives,  and describes 
capabil i t ies  for  carrying out  s trategy4.   Overal l  force s t ructure  object ives  
are provided in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) published by the 
Department of Defense.  In part,  the  DPG directs the number and type of 
divisions,  or  “operat ing forces,” the Army should f ield to meet  object ives 
outlined in the NMS.  For example,  the DPG specifies ten active army 
divisions as the number required to tackle two simultaneous major theater 
wars.   The DPG also specifies other “operating forces” requirements,  such 
as  separate  brigades or  Special  Forces groups,  to  accomplish this  task.  
In response to these documents,  which are considered Joint  Chiefs 
of Staff  (JCS)/ (DOD) directives,  the Army fur ther specifies the numbers 
and types of units  within the “operating forces.”  These forces are known 
as “generat ing forces,” and include units  below the divisional  and corps 
levels.   The breakout of these units,  further delineated in the Army Plan 
(TAP),  i s produced by Headquarters Department of the Army. 5  
The process by which the Army further determines force structure is  
rather complex and involves a detai led analysis  of input and guidance 
from several levels of the Army and the Department of Defense.   Force  
structure models must be both affordable and balanced to support  joint  
and Army planning, programming, and budgeting at all  levels of military 
                                                 
4 U . S .  A r m y  W a r  C o l l e g e ,  “ H o w  t h e  A r m y  R u n s :  A  S e n i o r  L e a d e r  R e f e r e n c e  H a n d b o o k , ”  C h .  5 ,  F i g .  5 -
11 ,  1999- 2000 .  
5 T A P  f o c u s e s  o n  t h e  s i x  p r o g r a m  y e a r s  p l u s  a n  a d d i t i o n a l  t e n .   I t  p r e s e n t s  c o m p l e t e  s t r a t e g i c ,  m i d -
t e r m  p l a n n i n g ,  a n d  pr o g r a m m i n g  g u i d a n c e  f o r  t h e  A r m y ’ s  p r o g r a m s  a n d  b u d g e t .   T A P  p r o v i d e s  a  
s u m m a r y  o f  t h e  c u r r e n t  f o r c e  s t r u c t u r e ,  t h e  P O M  f o r c e ,  a n d  t h e  p r o j e c t e d  f o r c e  t e n  y e a r s  b e y o n d .   
F i n a l l y ,  i t  p r o v i d e s  a  s t a r t  p o i n t  f o r  a l l  o t h e r  A r m y  s t r a t e g i c  f u n c t i o n a l  p l a n s  a n d  d i r e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  
b u i l d i n g  o f  t h e  P O M  ( “ H o w  t h e  A r m y  R u n s . . . ”   C h .  4 ,  p a r a  4 - 1 4  t h r u  4 - 16 ) .  
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operat ions:  s trategic,  operat ional ,  and tact ical .   Total  Army Analysis  
(TAA) is the mechanism by which the Army conducts force structure 
analysis and determination. The TAA is a multi -phased process consist ing 
of quali tat ive and quantitative analyses designed to generate both the 
tact ical  and support  forces necessary to carry out  missions del ineated in 
the DPG, TAP, and Il lustrat ive Planning Scenarios.    A complete 
explanation of the TAA process,  which i l lustrates how the force structure 
developmental  process takes place,  is  beyond the scope of the study.  
TAA is  a  resource- sensi t ive process based on Army doctr ine ,  
s trategic guidance from higher levels ,  threat  analysis ,  defined scenarios,  
and established budgetary constraints.  The Army’s total  warfighting 
requirements are a f inal  product of the TAA process,  conducted during 
even-numbered years.   This biennial  event also is  the basis  for the Army’s 
contribution to the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and 
establ ished ini t ia l  POM force. 6 The ini t ial  POM force is  the force 
recommended and supported by resource requests in the Army’s sl ice of 
the overall  DOD POM.  This POM force ultimately becomes part  of the 
TAA base force for any given program year.   Through the TAA process,  
requirements for supporting combat,  combat support ,  and combat service 
support ,  a t  echelons above corps and divis ions are  defined.  
As the Army mo ves forward with modernization programs,  new 
doctrines,  and changes to organizational structures,  a tracking system 
identifies changes and manages them efficiently.  The Structure and 
Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS), a computer database,  maintains 
a n d  tracks force structure information for the 8500+ units in the active 
Army, United States Army Reserve (USAR), and the ARNG.  From the 
SAMAS system, the Army utilizes The Army Authorization Documents 
                                                 
6 T h e  P O M  i s  s u b m i t t e d  t o  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  D e f e n s e  r e c o m m e n d i n g  t h e  t o t a l  r e s o u r c e s  o f  f u n d i n g  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  c u r r e n t  p r o g r a m s  a s  w e l l  a s  n e w  r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  t h e  f u t u r e .   
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System-Redesign (TAADS-R) to record changes in unit  missions, 
structure, and equipment.  TAADS-R also defines requirements and 
authorizations for all  TOE units using the SAMAS data.   A Table of 
Organization and Equipment (TOE) is  an organizational model developed 
from various sources of inputs through SAMAS. These include branch and 
functional  proponent assessments of capabil i t ies required on the 
battlefield.   Identifying, documenting, and processing requirements 
culminate in the creation of a TOE. 
The final product of the SAMAS and TAADS-R force development 
process is  the MTOE, which is  a modified version of the TOE.  I t  
prescribes a unit’s  organizational structure,  personnel manning, and 
equipment requirements for the performance of a specific mission.   For 
instance,  a General  Support  Aviation Battal ion (GSAB) MT OE would 
define a mission, and authorize the number and type of helicopters ( i .e.  
UH-60, UH-1, OH-58, etc.)  to be uti l ized in the fulfi l lment of the GSAB’s 
mission. 7  
In summary, Army force structure is top-down driven,  start ing with 
di rect ives  es tabl ished in the NMS and DPG.  From their origins,  each 
lower level  provides more detai led requirements and defines them, thus 
culminating with an MTOE for implementation by “operating units.”  
Tailoring of MTOE requirements to meet the assigned mission for the 
acti ve Army, USAR, and ARNG identifies Army resource requirements.   
The MTOE for a LUH battalion for instance, defines the LUH mission, 
number of required personnel,  and the type of helicopter needed to meet 
the LUH mission.  
                                                 
7 U . S .  A r m y  W a r  C o l l e g e ,  “ H o w  t h e  A r m y  R u n s :  A  S e n i o r  L e a d e r  R e f e r e n c e  H a n d b o o k , ”  C h .  5 , 
1999- 2000 .  
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The remainder  of  this  thesis  is  a  case study of key decisions and 
polit ical  influences that affected the LUH program.  This chapter 
descr ibed several  macro- level processes that helped determine Army force 
structure,  including the impact of changing roles and missions for the 
reserve compone nt.   Chapter II  will  provide a background to key events 
affecting the LUH program.  Chapter III  will  present a detailed case study 
focusing on major decision points and the polit ical  influences on the LUH 
program.  The final chapter will  summarize the key pol i t ical  inf luences 
affecting the LUH program and assess their implications for future Guard 








































II.  BACKGROUND 
This  chapter  provides an overview of army aviat ion doctr ine that  
underl ies  modernizat ion priori t ies ,  key poli t ical  events  of  the 1990s 
bearing on army aviation,  and defense budget reduction init iat ives 
affecting the LUH program and force structure.  First ,  I  discuss a short  
history of the roles and missions of uti l i ty helicopter and army doctrine.  
This includes a brief history of both the UH -1 and UH-60 hel icopter  and 
their operational use in the regular Army and the Army National Guard. 
Secondly,  I  wil l  explain the impact of the Army Restructure Initiative 
(ARI) on Army aviation modernization strategy, and specifically,  the 
impact of the RAH-66 Comanche program on util i ty helicopter 
modernization strategy. Thirdly,  I  will  analyze the impact of reduced 
defense budgets and the Clinton administration’s Bottom-Up Review on 
Army uti l i ty helicopter procurement init iat ives.  
A. ARMY DOCTRINE AND THE AGING HELICOPTER FLEET 
The active Army primarily relies on the UH -60 Black Hawk 
helicopter  to perform i ts  doctr inal ly based ut i l i ty hel icopter  mission.   
First  produced in 1977,  the Black Hawk is  the Army’s premier tact ical  
transport  helicopter performing roles such as combat assault ,  combat 
resupply,  bat t lef ield command and control ,  electronic warfare,  and 
medical evacuation.  Other U.S. Service branches and at  least  f i f teen 
foreign countries util ize variants of the UH -60, performing roles pert inent 
to their  respective service or  nat ion.   Doctr ine set  forth in Field Manual  
(FM) 100-5,  Operations , mandates that Army forces must be capable of 
full-dimensional  operat ions which is  defined as:  
employing all  means available to accomplish any given 
mission decisively and at  the least  cost—across the full  
range of  possible  operat ions in war and in operat ions 
other than war.8  
                                                 
8  “ O p e r a t i o n s , ”  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  t h e  A r m y ,  F i e l d  M a n u a l  1 0 0 - 5 ,  C h .  1 .  
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Furthermore, to functi on within the context of full-dimensional 
operat ions,  army aviat ion assets ,  part icularly ut i l i ty helicopters,  must  
successfully perform combat support  and combat service support  missions 
as  es tabl ished in  FM 1-100,  Army Aviation.  This means aviation assets  
must be equipped with modernized systems capable of harnessing the 
technological  revolution of the digit ized batt lefield.9  The current mix of 
ut i l i ty helicopter  airframes within the Army’s force structure calls  this  
capabil i ty into question.  
Before the introduction and fielding of the Black Hawk, the UH -1 
Iroquois was the Army’s primary helicopter for carrying out uti l i ty 
helicopter roles and missions.  The UH -1 helicopter,  commonly referred to 
as the “Huey,” has served the Army well  throughout the 1960s into the 
present ,  providing outstanding service in a ut i l i ty hel icopter  role.   Today,  
a significant number of Hueys continue to perform many of the utility 
hel icopter  roles and missions they tradit ionally supported in years past ,  
however,  these functions are now being overshadowed by the more 
technologically advanced and capable Black Hawk.  In FY-01, the Army 
continues to operate the Huey, with more than 800 UH -1 hel icopters 10  
fielded within the Army National Guard force structure.  
A significant portion of the Army’s uti l i ty helicopter f leet  consists  
of aging Vietnam era UH -1 helicopters.   The UH -1,  considered a  non-
modernized or  “legacy” type hel icopter ,  has surpassed i ts  useful  service 
l i fe  according to the Army.  This helicopter  has l imited capabil i t ies  fo r  
carrying payloads at  high alt i tudes and in hot temperatures,  when 
compared to the capabil i t ies of the newer UH -60 Black Hawk.  
Additionally, the UH -1 does not have modernized communications and 
avionics comparable to that  of other modernized army helicopters.  In 
                                                 
9  “ A r m y  A v i a t i o n , ”  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  t h e  A r m y ,  F i e l d  M a n u a l  1 - 1 0 0 ,  P a r a  1 - 4 .  
10  NGB- A V N ,  A i r c r a f t  R e a d i n e s s  M o d u l e ,  N o v  9 9 .  
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other words, the current mix of aging UH -1 helicopters in both the regular 
Army and Army National Guard are not digitized and have limited 
performance capabil i ty.  This wil l  prevent them from effectively operating 
on the digit ized batt lefield of the future.11  
B. AVIATION RESTRUCTURE INITIATIVE AND BUDGET  
The Army’s strategy to modernize i ts  aviation force structure was 
set  forth in the Aviation Restructure Init iat ive (ARI),  which was prepared 
by the Army Aviation Warfighting Center in February 1993.  ARI had 
several  object ives,  a  few of which included the goal  of  reducing aviat ion 
operat ing costs ,  correct ing deficiencies in the exist ing aviat ion force 
structure,  and facil i tat ing the retirement of older aircraft  in the Army’s 
inventory.  The Army based its strategy for meeting these and other 
object ives on anticipated funding levels .   ARI cal led for  an aggressive 
plan to restructure and modernize the attack helicopter f leet  by procuring 
the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter  as  well  as  enhancing the capabil i ties  of  
the existing AH-64 Apache helicopter with the Apache Longbow upgrade.   
At that  t ime, f iscal  years 1995-1999 modernizat ion plans cal led for  
spending $6.2 bil l ion on aviation modernization programs including $4.7 
bill ion earmarked for the Comanche and  Longbow Apache programs.  This 
meant all  other aviation modernization init iat ives,  including the 
procurement of UH -60 Black Hawk helicopters and the LUH funding, 
would come from the remaining $2.5 bil l ion. 12  
In addit ion to aviat ion modernization objectives,  ARI proposed an 
altogether new aviation structure,  the Light Util i ty Helicopter (LUH) 
                                                 
11  “ A n  A n a l y s i s  o f  U . S .  A r m y  H e l i c o p t e r  P r o g r a m s , ”  T h e  C o n g r e s s  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  C o n g r e s s i o n a l  
B u d g e t  O f f i c e ,  D e c  9 5 .  A v a i l a b l e .   [ O n l i n e ]  : h t t p : / / w w w . c b o . g o v / s h o w d o c . c f m ? i n d e x = 1 2 & f r o m  
= 1 & s e q u e n c e = 0  [ 2  F e b  0 0 ] .  
12  “ A r m y  A v i a t i o n :  M o d e r n i z a t i o n  S t r a t e g y  N e e d s  t o  B e  R e a s s e s s e d , ”  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  G e n e r a l  
A c c o u n t i n g  O f f i c e ,  N o v  9 4 ,  G A O / N S I A D- 95- 9 ,  p .  2 .  
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battalion. The design of the LUH force structure is to supplement corps 
level  ut i l i ty  hel icopter  missions and to provide capabil i t ies  where UH -60 
hel icopters  are  not  required.   The mission of the LUH is to provide uti l i ty 
aircraft  for  t ransport ing personnel  and equipment,  such as cri t ical  leaders 
and staff ,  in support  of corps operations.  The LUH battalion has 4 fl ight 
companies with 8 UH -1 hel icopters  assigned to each company; for a total 
of 32 UH-1 helicopters in each battal ion.   Each company is  a stand -alone 
unit  capable of operating independently without battal ion level  support .  
The structure of each fl ight company allows the corps commander 
f lexibil i ty in task organizing the LUH by company slices.13  Currently, 
each LUH battalion is assigned to the ARNG and arrayed over fourteen 
states .  
The Light Utili ty Helicopter Study conducted by Training and 
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 1994, validated the necessity for LUH.  
In the absence of a commercial  off  the shelf  (COTS) airframe to perform 
the LUH mission, the Army currently utilizes the UH -1H to carryout the 
LUH mission.  Most of these helicopters,  employing 1960’s technology, 
have seen continuous service for at  least  30 years .   The Army’s increased 
operational tempo, combined with the age of the UH -1 airframe i tself ,  has 
driven up the operations and support  costs associated with the UH -1.  At 
the same time UH-1 rel iabi l i ty  and maintainabil i ty  have decreased.14  
The Bottom-up Review (BUR) conducted by the Office of Secretary 
of Defense (OSD) in 1993 resulted in funding cuts for Black Hawk 
procurement beyond 1996.  Consequently modernization funding for army 
aviat ion previously envisaged under the ARI was slashed.   The purpose 
behind the BUR was to redefine Department of Defense strategy in the 
                                                 
13 M i k e  M c M a h o n ,  “ A v i a t i o n  R e s t r u c t u r i n g  I n i t i a t i v e , ”  U . S .  A r m y  A v i a t i o n  D i g e s t ,  March/Apr i l  1994 ,  
p .  3 4 .  
14 “ O p e r a t i o n a l  R e q u i r e m e n t s  D o c u m e n t  ( O R D ) , ”  L i g h t  U t i l i t y  H e l i c o p t e r :  V e r s i o n  5 ,  2 8  J a n  9 9 ,  
D i r e c t o r a t e  o f  C o m b a t  D e v e l o p m e n t s :  U .  S .  A r m y  A v i a t i o n  C e n t e r .  
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pos t-Cold War period including realignment of force structure and 
modernization programs to that end.  In turn, UH -60 procurement and 
fielding plans for the Army National Guard force str ucture were 
negatively affected by the decisions implemented through the BUR. 
Additionally,  modernization funding for the LUH force structure would 
also be affected by defense budget cuts.   Moreover,  the BUR 
recommendations reduced the $6.7 bil l ion in fund ing earmarked in the 
Army’s Aviation Modernization Plan and ARI init iat ives.  
The BUR strategy emphasized fighting two simultaneous Major 
Regional Conflicts (MRC) in support  of U.S. National Security Strategy.  
To support  this  two-MRC strategy the Army Nati onal  Guard would 
transit ion a significant  port ion of i ts  combat force of 37 brigades,  
including 15 enhanced readiness brigades.15   These enhanced brigades 
consisted mainly of ground combat units not encompassing utili ty 
hel icopter  units  or  assets .  Support  for the Army’s role in the two-MRC 
concept resulted in the enhanced brigades receiving priori ty funding for 
resource and modernization programs, with uti l i ty helicopter  aviat ion 
programs receiving significantly less.   Implementation of the BUR 
strategy, coupled with the nearly completed fielding of Black Hawks to 
the active Army, with only a part ial  f ielding to the Guard,  resulted in 
procurement for the UH -60 going unfunded beyond 1996.  The remaining 
UH-1 fleet  in an LUH role,  as well  as substi tut ing for the UH-60,  would 
have to suffice for accomplishing both state and federal  missions,  despite 
the shortage of Black Hawks in the Guard.  The Army National Guard 
would continue to receive Black Hawks on a l imited basis ,  as  the act ive 
component force structure was downsized under the auspices of the BUR. 
                                                 
15 A s p i n ,  L e s .  R e p o r t  o n  t h e  B o t t o m- U p  R e v i e w .  W a s h i n g t o n ,  D C :  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  D e f e n s e ,  O c t o b e r  
1 9 9 3 ,  p p .  9 3 - 94 .  
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In light of the ARI and the BUR, the Army National Guard stood to 
lose uti l i ty helicopter assets  and force structure.   The regular Army gave 
the LUH mission and force structure to the Army National Guard as a 
concession for losses incurred through these restructuring and downsizing 
init iatives.   Without maintaining uti l i ty helicopter force structure in the 
Guard,  s ta tes  would be i l l -prepared for  s tate act ive duty missions 
requiring uti l i ty helicopter  support .   State missions commonly include 
disaster  rel ief  support  such as f lood rel ief ,  f i re  f ighting,  search and 
rescue,  and more recently have added homeland defense.  
Init ially under the ARI, all  non-modernized UH -1 and OH-58A/C 
ser ies  hel icopters  were  to  be  e i ther  el iminated or  replaced by modernized 
aircraf t .   This  plan,  as  well  as  other  aviat ion modernizat ion plans cal led 
for the ret irement of the legacy fleet  of  tactically obsolete helicopters.   In 
al l ,  the el imination of more than 1,200 aircraft  wil l  reduce the Army’s 
future inventory.  The restructuring of army aviation force structure and 
el imination of older airframes fel l  within guidelines set  by Total  Army 
Analysis  2001 (TAA 01).16  
Later ,  in l ight  of  drast ic defense budget reductions and proposals 
recommended by the BUR, the army began to consider other options for 
modernizing the l ight uti l i ty fleet.   The anticipated procurement costs 
associated with a COTS design as well  as  the Army’s priori ty for  the 
Comanche brought about this change in view. Since procur ement of a 
COTS design to replace the UH -1 for the LUH role became more unlikely, 
industry teams introduced other proposals.  Consideration was given to 
upgrading the existing UH -1 fleet ,  entail ing a new engine design along 
with a modernized airframe and avionics  package.   This  proposal  
primarily affected UH -1 helicopters assigned to the LUH battal ions.  
                                                 
16  J e r r y  K .  H i l l ,  “ A v i a t i o n  R e s t r u c t u r i n g  I n i t i a t i v e :  T h e  D i v i s i o n a l  A v i a t i o n  B r i g a d e , ”  U .  S .  A r m y  
A v i a t i o n  D i g e s t ,  N o v / D e c  1 9 9 3 ,  p .  4 6 ;  R i c k  S c a l e s ,  “ A v i a t i o n  R e s t r u c t u r i n g  I n i t i a t i v e :  T h e  W a y  t o  t h e  
F u t u r e , ”  U . S .  A r m y  A v i a t i o n  D i g e s t ,  S e p / O c t  1 9 9 3 ,  p . 17 .  
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Despite the varied proposals for upgrading the UH -1, the aviat ion 
annex to Army Modernization Plan (AMP) released in March 1993 did not 
include a plan for  an upgrade or a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) 
for the existing UH -1 fleet. 17  Successive army aviation modernization 
plans throughout the 1990s would provide no definit ive objectives for the 
LUH force structure or upgrade programs for the UH -1. The bulk of 
aviation modernization funds were priorit ized for the Comanche program.  
Through fiscal year 2001 all  UH -1 helicopters in the LUH 
battalions,  and within other Army aviation force structure,  continue to 
operate with non-modernized uti l i ty helicopters.  The batt le over the 
defense budget and subsequent modernization funding continues to plague 
efforts at  modernizing the util i ty helicopter force structure in the Army 
National  Guard.  
Since 1995 numerous aircraft  safety of fl ight (SOF) messages have 
been issued on the UH-1 helicopter causing either complete grounding or 
restricted fl ight operations for most of the UH -1 fleet .   Fatigue,  relat ing 
to T-53 engine moving and drive train components,  appears in the 
majori ty of SOF messages.  A series of  engine problems and non-
availabil i ty of other UH -1 replacement  par ts  have accelerated a  required 
need for modernizing the remainder of the Army’s util i ty helicopter 
fleet. 18   These SOF messages, related to age and fatigue of UH -1 engine 
and airframe components, have ma de an already diff icult  s i tuation even 
worse .  
                                                 
17  G l e n  W .  G o o d m a n ,  “ A r m y  A v i a t i o n ’ s  S t e l l a r  P l a n s :  H a m s t r u n g  b y  B u d g e t  S h o r t f a l l s , ”  A r m e d  
F o r c e s  J o u r n a l  I n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  A p r i l  1 9 9 3 ,  p p .  3 7 - 38 .  
18  Chuck Steele, “Army Grounds Huey Fleet,” Defense Daily, Vol. 198., No. 60, 31 Mar 98, [LEXIS-NEXIS]: 4 Feb 00; “Army UH-




This chapter  provided an overview of significant  events affecting 
aviat ion modernization ini t iat ives.  A review of background events 
impacting the LUH program and force structure is crit ical to the  
understanding of why certain modernization decisions were made,  as well  
as providing insight into the challenges associated with procurement 
funding shortfal ls .  As explained earl ier  in this  chapter,  Army aviation 
programs such as the RAH-66 Comanche and Apache Longbow continue 
to hamper uti l i ty helicopter modernization efforts.  Funding priorit ization 
for these programs negatively impacts accelerated UH -60 procurement,  
UH-1 upgrade options,  or  the abil i ty to procure a COTS design to fulf i l l  
the LUH missions . The ARI and the Army’s modernization focus are 
stall ing efforts to modernize the uti l i ty helicopter fleet in the Army 
National Guard.  Consequently,  the Army National Guard is  i l l-prepared to 
perform its  state or wartime mission uti l izing exist ing legacy UH-1 
hel icopters .   This  includes ut i l i ty  hel icopter  hel icopters  assets  within the 
LUH battalions and the remaining Army National Guard force structure 





III. THE LIGHT UTILITY HELICOPTER – 
CONSTRAINED BY THE DEFENSE BUDGET 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION – LUH ROLE AND DESIGN. 
In this chapter I  will  discuss significant events and influences that  
affected the evolution of the LUH force structure,  from its inception in 
the early 1990s,  through present day. I  provide a case study recounting 
the developme nt of the LUH force structure, detailing LUH force structure 
decisions,  and other  interrelated hel icopter  modernizat ion decisions.  
I  wil l  f irst  explain helicopter design requirements for the LUH 
force structure,  the effect of the BUR and Comanche program on LUH 
funding, and the readjustment of reserve component aviation force 
structure carried out under the auspices of the Offsite Agreement.   
Second, after the LUH program stalled under the funding constraints for a 
COTS procurement,  I  describe proposed inte rim helicopter  solut ions 
considered by Army planners.  Third,  I  i l lustrate where steps bypassed in 
the Army’s force structure determination process complicated matters for 
a COTS procurement option.  Finally a short  discussion of related poli t ical  
agendas and influences is  presented.  
As mentioned earlier in chapter II ,  the LUH force structure is  
designed to support  corps level  missions where UH -60 helicopters  are not  
required and more cost  eff icient  bat t lef ield t ransportat ion is  desired for  
combat service sup port missions. Functionally,  the LUH Battalion with 
each of  i ts  four companies serves in a  combat  support  role at  Corps level .   
One of the controversial  issues surrounding LUH originates from the 
helicopter design necessary to perform the LUH role,  along w ith the Army 
component best  suited to receive the LUH force structure.  
B.   LUH DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 
In response to memorandum directives init iated by Headquarters 
TRADOC in January 1994, the United States Army Aviation Center 
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(USAAVNC) Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD) performed two 
studies to identify a helicopter design sufficient to fulfi l l  the LUH role.   
The second of the two studies was ini t iated to identify an appropriate 
Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) option in the event the UH -1  was  
se lected to perform in the LUH role.   The USAAVNC DCD forwarded the 
results of i ts  two studies to TRADOC in May and June 1994. 
This study included several  recommendations with regard to both 
LUH force structure and the existing util i ty helicopter.  First ,  tha t a 
commercial  off  the shelf  (COTS) helicopter design be eliminated from 
considerat ion due to addit ional  aircraft  procurement costs  as  well  as  the 
l imited number of LUH airframes that would be needed.  Furthermore, i t  
recommended that the UH -1 should be considered for the LUH mission 
only. Second, a UH -1 SLEP or upgraded operational  requirements 
document (ORD) 19  be init iated to support the LUH mission. Third, any 
future analysis or studies of uti l i ty helicopter l if t  requirements include the 
LUH. The final r ecommendation included the elimination of the LUH 
battalion headquarters,  with the subsequent reassignment of subordinate 
LUH fl ight  companies to divisional  general  support  aviation battal ions 
(GSAB).  
The SLEP study recommended minimum upgrade standards fo r the 
UH-1 if  util ized as an interim design for the LUH mission. An upgraded 
UH-1 in l ieu of  a  COTS design was based on the scenario of  l imited 
modernization funding. Serving in the LUH role, the UH -1 would  receive  
avionics  and wiring upgrades required for  the modern digitized 
batt lefield.  In addit ion,  and more significantly,  a recommendation was 
made that Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM) re-evaluate engine 
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t r a n s l a t e s  b r o a d  o p e r a t i o n a l  c a p a b i l i t i e s  d e s c r i b e d  i n  t h e  M N S  i n t o  s p e c i f i c  p e r f o r m a n c e  r e q u i r e m e n t s .   
I t  f u r t h e r  d e f i n e s  t h e  o p e r a t i o n a l  p e r f o r m a n c e  p a r a m e t e r s  n e e d e d  t o  s a t i s f y  t h e  n e e d  f o r  e a c h  p o t e n t i a l  
m a t e r i a l  s o l u t i o n ,  o r  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  L U H ,  t h e  r e q u i r e d  p e r f o r m a n c e  a n d  d e s i g n  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
n e c e s s a ry  t o  f u l f i l l  t h e  L U H  m i s s i o n . 
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alternatives for the 131 UH -1s that would serve in the LUH force 
structure.  
The LUH study, conducte d by USAAVNC and TRADOC, failed to 
consider al ternative aircraft  capable of performing the LUH mission.  
Alternative COTS aircraft  were eliminated from consideration due to cost ,  
Department of the Army directed force structure reductions,  and the long-
range  objectives of ARI.   Furthermore,  insufficient  aviation 
modernization funds and a shortfall  in UH -60 procurement forced the 
consideration of the UH -1 as an interim alternative for the LUH mission.  
Another shortcoming of the LUH study was the lack of information on 
LUH costs.  The DCD staff excluded efforts at  a comprehensive cost 
analysis during the study, primarily due to t ime constraints.  The entire 
LUH study was completed in less than 30-days, thus implying a less than 
comprehensive analysis  for  al l  pote ntial  design alternatives for the LUH.  
Moreover,  the procurement of a COTS helicopter to serve in the LUH role 
ran contrary to ARI goals and objectives for a future aviat ion force 
structure:   a  force structure containing reduced logist ic requirements and 
a  decrease in  overal l  modernizat ion costs . 20   The Army felt  i t  could i l l-
afford to add another helicopter to the inventory,  which required a new 
separate logist ics and maintenance trai l  for i ts  support .   By l imiting the 
scope of available options for  a LUH  design, the Army forced i tself  to 




                                                 
20  L i g h t  U t i l i t y  H e l i c o p t e r  ( L U H )  &  U H - 1  S e r v i c e  L i f e  E x t e n s i o n  P r o g r a m  ( S L E P )  S t u d y ,  D e p a r t m e n t  
o f  t h e  A r m y ,  H Q  T R A D O C  a n d  U S A A V N C ,  M a y  1 9 9 4 .  
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C. RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY–IMPACT OF  
COMMANCHE AND ARI  
 
ARI, and all  Army Aviation modernization plans since 1993, 
identif ied reconnaissance and securi ty missions as a  focal  point  for  
aviation modernization. As a CONUS -based power project ion Army, 
reconnaissance and securi ty missions are essential  to the success of  
forward deployed forces.   Operat ional ly,  a ir  maneuver  by aviat ion assets  
in a reconnaissance and securi ty role protects  fr iendly ground forces and 
supports the maneuver battle,  enabling the ground commander to exploit  
tact ical  opportunit ies .21   This is  why the Comanche helicopter is  seen as 
the primary focus of the Army’s long- term aviation modernization 
strategy. I t  is  also the Army’s most expensive acquisit ion program at an 
overal l  projected cost  of  $48 bi l l ion.   By 2008 Comanche is  projected to 
account for 64 percent of the Army Aviation budget,  when the estimated 
annual product ion costs  wil l  reach at  least  $2 bi l l ion.  This  t ranslates  into 
reduced funding levels for other aviation modernization requirements,  
such as those associated with the uti l i ty helicopter f leet . 22  
The decision to priori t ize aircraft  modernizat ion resour ces for the 
Comanche and Apache Longbow upgrade programs forced the retention of 
older uti l i ty and cargo airframes in the Army’s inventory.  Additionally,  
priori t ized resourcing for these programs severely impacted both the UH -
60 and LUH programs. The importance of Comanche was cited in the 1993 
BUR, noting, “Our experience in the Persian Gulf war and other recent 
operations has shown that the batt lefield information that  reconnaissance 
helicopters provide is  becoming increasingly important  in modern 
                                                 
21  A v i a t i o n  R e s t r u c t u r e  I n i t i a t i v e  B r i e f i n g ,  U . S .  A r m y  A v i a t i o n  C e n t e r ,  S e p t e m b e r 1 9 9 3 ;  1 9 9 8  A r m y  
M o d e r n i z a t i o n  P l a n ,  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  t h e  A r m y ,  1 3  A p r  9 8 ,  A n n e x  G :  A v i a t i o n . 
22  “ C o m a n c h e  P r o g r a m  C o s t s ,  S c h e d u l e ,  a n d  P e r f o r m a n c e  S t a t u s :  D e f e n s e  A c q u i s i t i o n s , ”  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
G e n e r a l  A c c o u n t i n g  O f f i c e ,  A u g  9 9 :  G A O / N S I A D- 99- 146 .  
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warfare .” 23   As a consequence of  these aviat ion priori t ies ,  increased UH -
60 procurement,  decisions relating to a COTS LUH design, and other 
uti l i ty helicopter modernization init iat ives would languish.   
D.  OFFSITE AGREEMENT, ARI, AND ARMY BUDGET 
One object ive of  ARI, the reduction of older airframes from the 
Army’s inventory,  led all  components into a three-way competit ion for 
uti l i ty helicopter assets.  A complicating factor intensifying the 
competit ion was a reduced Army aviation modernization budget.  The 
Army elected to priorit ize funding for programs like the Comanche and 
Apache Longbow. Modernization objectives for both these programs were 
formalized in the 1993 Army Modernization Plan and continued with each 
subsequent plan through 1998.24  
The regular Army, US AR, and the ARNG all  competed for uti l i ty 
hel icopter  assets ,  however the 1993 Active/Reserve Offsi te  Agreement on 
roles and readiness changed all  that .  Announced by Secretary of Defense 
Les Aspin in December 1993, the Offsite Agreement25  forged a new 
partnership among the Army’s three components.  The agreement was in 
response to the end of the Cold War and reflected commitment to a power 
projection reshaping init iat ive by active and reserve components.  In the 
end, the agreement among all of the components e liminated the USAR as a 
major competi tor  for  rotary-wing aviation force structure,  including 
uti l i ty helicopter assets.   Under the agreement the USAR util i ty helicopter 
force structure was transferred to the ARNG. In turn,  the USAR received 
combat  service support  force structure from the ARNG.  Despite this 
                                                 
23  G l e n  W .  Go o d m a n ,  J r . ,  “ S e c o n d  t o  N o n e :  U S  A r m y  A v i a t i o n ’ s  F u t u r e  L o o k s  B r i g h t e r  T h a n  E v e r , ”  
A r m e d  F o r c e s  J o u r n a l ,  M a r  9 6 ,  p p .  2 3 ,  2 6 .  
24  A v i a t i o n  R e s t r u c t u r e  I n i t i a t i v e  B r i e f i n g ,  U . S .  A r m y  A v i a t i o n  C e n t e r ,  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 9 3 ;   1 9 9 3  A r m y  
M o d e r n i z a t i o n  P l a n s ;  1 9 9 6  A r m y  M o d e r n i z a t i o n  P l a n ;  1 9 9 8  A r m y  M o d e r n i z a t i o n  P l a n . 
25  J .  H .  B i n f o r d  P e a y ,  I I I ,  J o h n  R .  D ' A r a u j o ,  J r . ,  a n d  M a x  B a r a t z ,  “ B u i l d i n g  f o r  t h e  F u t u r e :  T h e  
A c t i v e / R e s e r v e  O f f s i t e  A g r e e m e n t , ”  A r m y ,  4 4  ( N o v e m b e r  1 9 9 4 ) :  4 4 - 49 .  
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transfer of aviation force structure,  ARNG gains in uti l i ty helicopter 
assets  did not  offset  total  helicopter  losses incurred under the ARI.  
Even after the Offsite Agreement, the ARI and defense budget 
r eductions st i l l  posed a threat  to the exist ing aviat ion force structure 
within the active Army and ARNG. The ARNG was sti l l  programmed to 
lose a significant  number of ut i l i ty helicopters and parts  of  i ts  aviat ion 
force structure.  Under ARI, both the Army and ARNG were scheduled to 
reduce the uti l i ty helicopter f leet  by 33 percent,  which included more than 
1300 UH -1 airframes. 26  The loss of this  number of helicopters would have 
a negative impact  on state requirements to support  disaster  rel ief  and 
other  s imilar operations.  The ARNG viewed the LUH structure as a means 
to maintain uti l i ty helicopter force structure in the Guard.27   The end to 
any additional UH -60 procurement beyond fiscal year 1996 helped support 
the ARNG position on maintaining existing utili ty hel icopter  assets .  The 
defense budget did not authorize funding for additional UH -60 
procurement beyond 1996. Until  a COTS design could be fielded, the UH -
1 would suffice as a suitable substi tute for the LUH force structure.  
Guidance handed down in the 1993 BUR by the OSD reaffirmed 
some of the Army’s aviation modernization priori t ies,  including those 
associated with at tack and reconnaissance hel icopter  assets .  However i t  
neglected to provide any mention of uti l i ty helicopter modernization or to 
address  a comprehensive acquisit ion strategy. 28  Furthermore, the Army 
then prioritized aviation funding for both the Comanche and Apache 
Longbow programs. As long as funding was allocated toward these 
                                                 
26  “ A n  A n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  U . S .  A r m y  H e l i c o p t e r  P r o g r a m s . ”  C o n g r e s s i o n a l  B u d g e t  O f f i c e ,  D e c  9 5 ,  
A v a i l a b l e  [ O n l i n e ] : h t t p : / / w w w . c b o . g o v / s h o w d o c . c f m ? i n d e x = 1 2 & f r o m = 1 & s e q u e n c e = 4 ,  [ 2  F e b  0 0 ] .  
27  A l b e r t  P a t t e r s o n ,  i n t e r v i e w  b y  a u t h o r ,  E n t e r p r i s e ,  A l . ,  1 2  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 0 ;  G r e g o r y  P a r r i s h ,  
i n t e r v i e w  b y  a u t h o r ,  H a r r i s b u r g ,  P a . , 1 6  F e b r u a r y  2 0 0 0 .  
28  A s p i n ,  L e s .  R e p o r t  o n  t h e  B o t t o m- U p  R e v i e w .  W a s h i n g t o n ,  D C :  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  D e f e n s e ,  O c t o b e r  
1993 .  
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programs, no accelerated procurement of the UH -60 and a COTS LUH 
design would l ikely material ize.  
E.   REQUIREMENT FOR A LUH MISSION 
The Army identified a batt lefield requirement for a LUH force 
structure. Although the Army had set its sights on Comanche and 
Longbow programs as their  priori ty,  i t  a lso identif ied a requirement for 
the LUH to supplement batt lefield combat service support  needs.  
Surveyed Aviation Brigade commanders throughout the Army and ARNG 
identif ied a need for a LUH force structure soon after  i t  became apparent 
that ARI would reduce their  uti l i ty mission capabil i t ies .  Uti l i ty hel icopter  
missions routinely given to battal ion general  support  aviat ion or air  
assault  battal ions now degraded combat power in the ARI design force 
structures.  For example,  in an assault  helicopter company, instead of 
having tw enty- three UH-1 hel icopters  at  their  disposal ,  commanders now 
had only eight to accomplish the same number of missions. In other words 
commanders had fewer uti l i ty helicopter assets  to support  their  primary 
mission of combat air  movement and air  assault  in addition to performing 
combat service support  or  administrat ive type transport  missions.  The 
requirement for aviation assets to support  these non-combat  service 
missions has always existed.   The advent of ARI and an austere aviation 
modernization budget forced the Army to priorit ize funding for other 
initiatives, rather than the LUH program.  
F.   FORCE STRUCTURE ASSIGNMENT 
Another point of contention was where to assign the LUH force 
structure.  One option,  as discussed in a January 1996 NGB Aviation 
information paper, favored assignment of one LUH Company to each of 
the eighteen divisional  GSABs. This assignment relat ionship was favored 
mainly in response to feedback received at  a  previous Aviat ion Brigade 
Commanders Conference.  Aviation commanders were concerned with 
having access to eff icient ,  cost-effective aerial  t ransport  of  personnel  and 
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equipment,  util izing aircraft  that required something less than the more 
costly UH -60; meaning primarily operations and maintenance costs.  ARI 
had reduced their  avai lable helicopter  assets ,  forcing them to divert  their  
available UH -60 platforms to service support  missions.  Under the 
proposal  eighteen addit ional  LUH companies would be formed for each of 
the act ive and reserve combat  divisions.  These companies would be 
formed in addition to those LUH battalions organic to XVIII Corps, III  
Corps and I  Corps.  The LUH companies under each divisional GSAB 
would provide the needed support  for  s taff  t ransport ,  l ia ison,  air  
messenger service,  and air  movement of supply missions.29 
The problem with this plan for the ARNG was that LUH force 
structure gains proposed by this plan would not make up for total  losses 
incurred under ARI.   The active Army would receive a significant  port ion 
of force structure,  leaving the ARNG with an inadequate number of utility 
helicopters to perform state support  missions.  The ARNG would need to 
acquire al l  LUH companies to even come close to regaining ARI losses.   
As a result  of the Offsite Agreement,  the USAR was removed from 
considerat ion as  a  recipient of the LUH force structure. Competition over 
which Army component would gain this structure lay between the regular 
Army and the ARNG. The procurement of a COTS design aircraft  to serve 
in the LUH role would certainly favor the active army over the guard.  
However such an acquisi t ion was in confl ict  with aviat ion modernization 
objectives as envisaged under ARI,  and the Army’s Modernization Plans 
that  emphasized development of at tack and reconnaissance capabil i t ies.  
Approval of a COTS design by Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and 
Plans (DCSOPS) would also allow LUH to compete against  Comanche,  
                                                 
29  “ F o r c e  S t r u c t u r e  D e v e l o p m e n t , ”  P a u l  K e l l y  &  J o s e p h  F e r r e i r a ,  N a t i o n a l  G u a r d  B u r e a u  A v i a t i o n 
(NGB - AVN - O R ) ,  I n f o r m a t i o n  P a p e r ,  2 2  J a n  9 6 .  
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Apache Longbow, and other aviation budget programs.  Given the austere 
budget,  priority placed on Comanche and Longbow, and congressional 
scrutiny of Comanche developmental  delays,  the Army could not also 
afford a COTS procurement.   Since i ts  inception in 1983, the Comanche 
program has been restructured five t imes,  primarily out of concern for 
program affordabili ty and changing requirements.   The last  restructuring 
took place in July 1998.30   Given the t ime and resources already invested,  
the Army was not about to jeopardize the Comanche program by 
redirecting procurement funds for LUH. 
G.   CONGRESSIONAL CRITICISM 
According to an August 1999 GAO Report,  the Army would not 
achieve i ts  uti l i ty helicopter requirements due to funding imbalances in 
the 1998 aviation modernization plan.  The Army recognized this problem 
and made the decision to keep the UH -1 in  service wel l  into the 21 s t  
century.   They also identif ied an unfunded requirement for ninety UH -60 
helicopters .  The Senate Armed Services Committee was cri t ical  of  this  
plan,  and in a report  accompanying the 1998 National Defense 
Authorizat ion Bil l  ci ted readiness concerns with regard to the National  
Guard util i ty hel icopter  f leet .   An earl ier  GAO report  in  November 1994 
cited similar concerns and the consequences of the Army’s strategy to 
develop the Comanche at the expense of other modernization programs.31 
The planned cessation of UH -60 procurement beyond 1996, and 
pressure from Congress and the ARNG, forced the Army to consider 
al ternatives to their  overall  ut i l i ty helicopter  modernization strategy.  The 
Army’s aviation modernization plan was too broad,  given the reduced 
                                                 
30  “ C o m a n c h e  P r o g r a m  C o s t s ,  S c h e d u l e ,  a n d  P e r f o r m a n c e  S t a t u s :  D e f e n s e  A c q u i s i t i o n s , ”  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
G e n e r a l  A c c o u n t i n g  O f f i c e  A u g  9 9 :  G A O / N S I A D- 99- 146 .  
31  “ C o m a n c h e  P r o g r a m  C o s t s ,  S c h e d u l e ,  a n d  P e r f o r m a n c e  S t a t u s :  D e f e n s e  A c q u i s i t i o n s , ”  U nited States  
G e n e r a l  A c c o u n t i n g  O f f i c e ,  A u g  9 9 :  G A O / N S I A D- 99- 1 4 6 ;  “ M o d e r n i z a t i o n  S t r a t e g y  N e e d s  t o  b e  
R e a s s e s s e d :  A r m y  A v i a t i o n , ”  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  G e n e r a l  A c c o u n t i n g  O f f i c e ,  N o v  9 4 :  G A O / N S I A D- 95- 9 .  
 26 
funds budgeted for modernization. Senate Ar med Services Committee 
members and professional staff  cri t icized the plan for attempting to keep 
alive too many programs. The high cost of Comanche made it  difficult  to 
justify so many different programs for Army aviation. Although the Army 
acknowledged that  most of i ts  uti l i ty helicopter f leet  had been modernized 
with the UH-60,  this  did not  include al l  of  the ut i l i ty helicopters assigned 
to the ARNG. Approximately 30 percent of the ARNG util i ty helicopter 
fleet would remain “unmodernized” after the last  UH-60 helicopters rolled 
off  the Sikorsky assembly l ines.  The pressures and cri t icism exerted upon 
the Army forced the consideration of less expensive options to sustain or 
upgrade the existing legacy util i ty fleet in the ARNG.32   
H. T800 ENGINE OPTION: WORKING WITH CONTRACTOR 
INTERESTS 
 
By late 1996 the Army considered less expensive options to a COTS 
helicopter design as a result  of the ongoing modernization budget 
shortfal l .  One option given serious considerat ion was a plan to re-engine 
the UH-1H with the Comanche T800 engine.  Both the Army and NGB 
leadership signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in a cooperative 
effort  to facil i tate the T800 engine replacement option.  Essential ly the re-
engine option was to be part  of an Early Production And Fielding (EPAF)  
plan for the Comanche T800 engine.  An EPAF of the T800 would allow 
the engines to be field- tested in the UH -1H ai r f rame,  as  wel l  as  provide  
for an interim replacement for the current T53 engine.  Later,  upon 
ret irement,  the T800 engines would be recovered from the UH-1 fleet  and 
rebuil t  for use in the Comanche helicopter.   The concept or idea behind 
replacing T53 engines with the T800 originated from a 1994-95 success  
                                                 
32  G r e g  C a i r e s  a n d  G a r y  C r o u s e ,  “ O S D  S a y s  A r m y ’ s  B l a c k  H a w k  P l a n  T h r e a t e n s  S i k o r s k y ’ s  S u r v i v a l , ”  
D e f e n s e  W e e k l y ,  12  Ju ly  1996 ,  Vo l  192 ,  No  8 . [Lex i s - N e x i s ] :  4  F e b  0 0 .  
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story involving the replacement of UH -1 engines in U.S.  Border Patrol  
hel icopters .  
An advantage to fielding the T800 engine ahead of the Comanche’s 
schedule was in i ts  contribution to cost  savings.   The manufacturer,  Allied 
Signal  (LHTEC),  was prepared to begin ful l- scale manufacturing of the 
engine,  however,  delays in Comanche airframe and system tests would 
soon incur addit ional  engine production costs.  Airframe fielding and 
associated system test ing was at  least  three years behind T800 engine 
development.  The Util i ty Helicopter program manager (PM) saw the UH -1 
T800 option as an opportunity to reduce overall  costs  for the Comanche 
program; by maintaining minimum production levels for the T800 engine 
with LHTEC, while at  the same time providing a viable interim solution to 
the Army’s uti l i ty helicopter predicament. 33   
Additional advantages to  the T800 replacement option included 
f irs t ,  extensive f ield- testing of the T800 engines before full- sca le  
Comanche production began, thus providing valuable risk reduction data 
for long- term cost savings.   Second, savings in Comanche non- recurring 
manufacturing costs by util izing NGB funds to purchase approximately 
one hundred fifty T800 engines under an EPAF plan. Cost savings in this 
arena were est imated to be in excess of  $50 mil l ion.   Third,  the T800 
replacement of the UH -1 T53 engine al lowed for  an interim solution to the 
UH-1 engine problem in the ARNG as well  as  a  work-around to the non-
approved LUH ORD.  Until the UH -1 was ret ired,  an engine upgrade 
appeared a wise interim solution for the ARNG. Fourth,  the enhancement 
of a joint  working relationshi p between the active and reserve components 
over priori ty modernizat ion endeavors made for  good poli t ics .  A 
cooperative modernization effort  between NGB and the active Army on 
the T800 EPAF plan appeared to be a  win for  both s ides.  Despite  al l  the 
                                                 
33  M i c h a e l  C h a s e ,  I n t e r v i e w  b y  a u t h o r ,  A r l i n g t o n ,  V A ,  2 3  A p r i l  2 0 0 1 .  
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posi t ives,  the Army decided against the engine upgrade plan, due to i ts  
incompatibil i ty with the aviation modernization objectives,  the planned 
retirement of legacy UH -1 airframes,  and funding priori t ies for  
Comanche. 
By June 1997 the T800 replacement option began to give way to a 
commercial  hel icopter  lease plan for  the LUH.  A lease plan was 
considered due to concern for long- term costs  associated with the T800 
engine replacement option.  Another factor was cost  savings as compared 
to the unfunded COTS procurement option.  The lease plan could be 
funded through the aviation operations and maintenance (O&M) budget,  
which was budgeted on an annual basis.  Therefore i t  would not compete 
for procurement dollars earmarked for Comanche and other aviation 
acquisi t ion programs. The lease option never materialized,  as the Army 
did not approve of the plan. The Army was unwilling to spend O&M funds 
to support such a program.   
Although the ARNG favored the leasing option, the Army 
considered i t  too costly and a budget drain on O &M dol lars . 34  In addition 
to the hel icopter  lease plan,  a  T-53 engine - leasing plan was also brought 
to the table.   The engine lease plan,  involving rebuil t  T-53 engines was 
also disapproved for  the same reasons as  the aircraf t  lease opt ion;  overal l  
O&M budget costs.   The Army remained focused on Comanche and other 
programs through 1999, with li t t le change occurring for LUH or util i ty 
helicopter modernization.  
A comprehensive uti l i ty helicopter f leet  modernization study, 
sponsored by the ut i l i ty  hel icopter  program manager,  was completed in 
                                                 
34  G r e g  C a i r e s ,  “ T 8 0 0  T u r b i n e  U n l i k e l y  t o  b e  U n s e a t e d  a s  U H - 1 H  R e p l a c e m e n t  E n g i n e , ”  D e f e n s e  
D a i l y ,  15  Apr i l  1997 :  Vo l .  195 ,  No .  11 , [Lex i s - N e x i s ] :  4  F e b  0 0 ;  R o b e r t  P .  B i r m i n g h a m ,  “ T 8 0 0  E a r l y  
P r o d u c t i o n , ”  A r m y  A v i a t i o n ,  2 8  F e b r u a r y  1 9 9 7 :  V o l .  4 6 ,  N o .  2 ,  9 - 10 .  
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May 1999.  The purpose of the study was to determine the most 
operationally effective and affordable program to modernize the uti l i ty 
helicopter  f leet  for  the FY00-FY25 time period.  Operational Requirement 
Documents (ORD) for the future UH-60X and LUH were both considered 
in the study.  The fifteen-month study was assisted by a General  Officer 
Steering Committee (GOSC) which included representatives from the 
USAAVNC, NGB, and Program Manager (PM) Comanche, as well  as more 
than ten other army commands or staff directorates.  The May 1999 fleet 
modernization study was both thorough and systematic in i ts analysis.  
Army National Guard state mission requirements were given 
consideration in the uti l i ty helicopter f leet  modernization analysis .   Pr ior  
to approval of the recommendations made in the study, no approved plan 
existed which addressed the aging UH -1 and UH-60 fleet .   The lack of an 
approved modernization strategy has contributed to inadequate funding to 
support  a  Force XXI and Army after next (AAN) fleet modernization.  
Several  versions of the UH -1 were considered for  the LUH role and for  
continuation in the ARNG strategic reserve divisions.   This included a 
UH-1 with an engine upgrade and “digit ized or bussed” configuration,  as  
wel l  as  a  “non-bussed” configuration.  Eight uti l i ty helicopter fleet  mix 
options were developed in the f leet  modernizat ion analysis .   All  options 
included the LUH in various UH -1 upgrade and non-upgrade 
configurations.   Option three was selected as the overal l  recommended 
util i ty fleet modernization strategy.  This option included an LUH ORD-
compliant “digitized” aircraft  capable of meeting the emerging LUH 
requirements.  In other words a LUH design comparable to the UH -1 with 
an engine upgrade and “bus sed” for  the digi t ized bat t lef ield.35   
                                                 
35  “ U t i l i t y  H e l i c o p t e r  F l e e t  M o d e r n i z a t i o n  S t u d y , ”  U . S .  A r m y  A v i a t i o n  a n d  M i s s i l e  C o m m a n d ,  M a y  
1999 .  
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However,  since 1994, more than eighteen safety of f l ight (SOF) 
messages related to airframe or component fatigue already had plagued 
the UH-1. Furthermore,  the t iming of the study’s release coincided with 
two more s ignificant SOF messages and subsequent UH -1 hel icopter  
groundings. The recommendations of the fleet modernization study as 
related to a LUH design were for the most part  ignored; overshadowed by 
the continued plight of the aging UH -1 and the advent of a new aviat ion 
modernization strategy. 36   The new strategy included the creation of a new 
force structure called the Multi - function Battalion (MFB), which 
eliminated the requirement for the LUH force structure.  
On Apri l  4,  2000,  at  a  DOD news briefing,  BG Craig D. Hackett ,  
the Director of Requirements,  Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Operations and Plans (ADCSOP),  Force Development and other 
participating staff announced a new Army aviation modernization 
program.  They presented the MFB force structure plan and f ie lded var ied 
press questions relating to the new aviation modernization plan.   During 
the news briefing one of BG Hackett’s staff announced the elimination of 
the LUH battalion from the Army’s future force structure.37  
I.  DOCTRINE, TRAINING, LEADER DEVELOPMENT, 
ORGANIZATION, MATERIAL, AND SOLDIER 
REQUIREMENTS  (DTLOMS) IMPACT 
 
Continued support and justification for a LUH budget depended 
upon the Army’s force structure determination process,  primarily the 
development of  doctr ine,  t raining,  leader development,  organization, 
material ,  and soldier requirements.  Better  known as DTLOMS, this force 
                                                 
36  “ A M C O M  A v i a t i o n  S a f e t y  M e s s a g e s , ”  U . S .  A r m y  A v i a t i o n  a n d  M i s s i l e  C o m m a n d ,  A v a i l a b l e  
[ O n l i n e ] : h t t p : / / w w w . r e d s t o n e . a r m y . m i l / s o f / s a f e t y t a b l e . h t m ,  [ 3 0  J a n  0 0 ] .  
37  “ S p e c i a l  B r i e f i n g  o n  A r m y  A v i a t i o n  M o d e r n i z a t i o n  P r o g r a m , ”  H a c k e t t ,  C r a i g  D .  D O D  N e w s  
B r i e f i n g .  A v a i l a b l e  [ O n l i n e ] : h t t p : / / w w w . d e f e n s e l i n k . m i l / n e w s /  A p r 2 0 0 0 / t 0 4 0 4 2 0 0 0 _ t 4 0 4 a r m y . h t m l ,  [ 4  
A p r i l  2 0 0 0 ] .  
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structure determination process normally occurs in a  specif ic  order  
beginning with doctrine development,  and ending in material  design. 
DTLOMS is a sub -process  of Total Army Analysis.38  
Another barrier for the continued development of the LUH force 
structure and COTS design was due to an incomplete DTLOMS process.  
Two domains of DTLOMS, doctrine and material ,  were never fully 
developed which resulted in the exclus ion of LUH from the Army’s 
aircraft  procurement,  also known as the APA budget.  As long as the 
DTLOMS process remained incomplete,  TRADOC could neither complete 
i ts  required staffing,  nor could DSCOPS approve LUH for inclusion to the 
APA budget. 39   
Doctrine  for the LUH force structure was neither approved by 
TRADOC nor completed by doctrine developers in the form of doctrinal  
field manuals.  Although a need existed for LUH, doctrinal guidance on 
LUH battalion tactical employment was never completed by USAAVNC in 
coordination with TRADOC. The second domain of material  was of more 
immediate significance. In the case of LUH, material  development was 
t ied direct ly to the select ion of the aircraft  design required to fulf i l l  the 
LUH role.  Select ion of  a  part icular  hel icopter  design -  whether a COTS 
design, an upgraded UH -1, or something else -  necessi tated the approval  
of an ORD.  
J.   POLITICAL AGENDAS  
During my analysis for polit ical influences on the LUH force 
structure determination process,  I  invest igated possible  DOD advisory 
committee influence on the decision-making process by the Army. The 
                                                 
38  “ F o r c e  D e v e l o p m e n t :  R e q u i r e m e n t s  D e t e r m i n a t i o n , ”  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  t h e  A r m y :  T r a i n i n g  a n d  
D o c t r i n e  C o m m a n d ,  T R A D O C  P a m p h l e t  7 1 - 9 ,  5 N o v  9 9 ,  p  1 3 ;  A l b e r t  P a t t e r s o n ,  I n t e r v i e w  b y  a u t h o r ,  
E n t e r p r i s e ,  P a . ,  1 2  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 0 .  
39  A l b e r t  P a t t e r s o n ,  I n t e r v i e w  b y  a u t h o r ,  E n t e r p r i s e ,  A l . , 1 2  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 0 .  
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member composit ion of advisory committees often leads to bias in the 
shaping of specif ic policies.  DOD advisory committees,  whose members 
are influenced by their  external i ndustr ial  and f inancial  t ies ,  are no 
exception.   Advisory committee membership usually consists  of people 
with a clear  interest  in government decision-making and the impact on 
DOD contractors,  f inancial  insti tutions,  and industry.   All  too often their  
arguments and committee representation reflect more the private than the 
public interest .   Evidence shows the strong presence of DOD contractor 
representat ion on advisory committees.   Historical ly,  companies such as 
Boeing, Lockheed, United Technologies,  and others ,  are represented on 
these committees.   For example, DOD advisory committee membership at  
the end of 1979 stood at  777 members.40  
Select  interviews with ret i red Army personnel  and congressional  
staff  revealed no evidence of advisory committee influenc e on the LUH 
program. However several  of the LUH design options,  mainly the various 
UH-1 engine upgrade and leasing plans,  appeared to at  least  at tract  some 
interest  by select  members of Congress.   This interest  was probably due in 
part to the effect such plans had within their  respect ive congressional  
distr icts .  LUH was influenced more by decisions made within DOD and 
the Army, rather than by any committee, or even individual membership 
to each respect ive Armed Services committee on Capital  Hil l .41  
The airframe design requirement for the LUH as explained in this 
chapter  is  fair ly straightforward.  The Army had basical ly two design 
choices for the LUH; a COTS procurement or several  SLEP or upgrade 
options for the UH -1.  I  also discussed how BUR budget constraints and 
                                                 
40 G o r d o n ,  A d a m s ,  “ T h e  I r o n  T r i a n g l e , ”  ( T r a n s a c t i o n  B o o k s ) ,  N e w  B r u n s w i c k ,  N J ,  1 9 8 2 ,  1 6 7 .  
41 J o h n  B a r n e s ,  S e n a t e  A r m e d  S e r v i c e s  C o m m i t t e e ,  I n t e r v i e w  b y  A u t h o r ,  W a s h i n g t o n ,  D C ,  4  J a n u a r y  
2 0 0 1 ;  A l b e r t  P a t t e r s o n ,  I n t e r v i e w  b y  a u t h o r ,  E n t e r p r i s e ,  A l . ,  1 2  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 0 .  
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pressures to accelerate an already behind schedule Comanche program, 
forced the Army to prioritize procurement funding for the Comanche 
instead of the LUH. In addition, a l imited aviation modernization budget 
and the growing age of the UH -1 f leet  caused the Army to focus efforts on 
more long- range priorit ies.  Continued reliance on the UH -1, now in 
service for more than thirty years,  was not part  of the Army’s future force 
structure plan under the ARI.  Complicating matters,  the incompletely 
fo l lowed Army force structure determination process,  known as DTLOMS, 
provided the Army a means for delaying final  decision on a COTS design. 
This  decis ion-making tactic,  or  lack of a decision,  prevented the 
siphoning-off of aviation procurement funds from the Comanche program.
 Regarding poli t ical  influences on the LUH program, I  discovered 
that  most influences and force structure decisions were made within the 
Army itself.  Although some members of Congress voiced concerns about 
the pace of Army aviation modernization,  these concerns had l i t t le  or  no 
influence on LUH decisions made by the Army. If anything Congressional 
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IV.  CONCLUSIONS:  SUMMARY OF FACTORS 
AFFECTING THE LUH FORCE STRUCTURE 
 
In this chapter,  I  will  summarize the key factors that affected 
dec is ion-making about the LUH force structure.  A constrained Army 
modernization budget,  the ways in which the Army force structure was 
determine d, and incompatible Army and ARNG goals contributed to LUH 
design and deployment plans that  proved to be inadequate to the aircraft’s  
missions.  
The LUH force structure evolved out of a need for cost-effect ive 
batt lefield air  t ransportat ion that  would not  detract from the combat 
power  of  forward-operating aviation units .   In other words,  uti l i ty 
helicopters would operate in the f ield so that  UH -60s would not  be drawn 
away from combat missions to provide non-combat and administrative 
transport .   Many factors influenced the direction the LUH would take in 
i ts  evolution from the early LHX program42  to its eventual form under the 
avia t ion- restructuring plan.  The remainder of this chapter will  summarize 
key factors and polit ical  influences that affected the LUH program.  The 
summary will  include general  recommendations for future aviation force 
s t ructure decis ion-making.  
A. BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS 
The 1993 BUR, combined with defense budget reductions,  derailed 
the Army’s plan for ARI.  The anticipated funding needed to  implement 
ARI along the Army’s planned time line never materialized.  Since the 
Comanche program was st i l l  deemed the cornerstone of Army aviation’s 
                                                 
42  T h e  L i g h t  H e l i c o p t e r  E x p e r i m e n t a l  ( L H X )  p r o g r a m  o f  t h e  1 9 8 0 s  e v e n t u a l l y  e v o l v e d  i n t o  t h e  R A H-
6 6  C o m a n c h e  p r o g r a m .   L H X  o r i g i n a l l y  e n c o m p a s s e d  l i g h t  u t i l i t y ,  a t t a c k ,  a n d  s c o u t  h e l i c o p t e r  
a i r f r a m e  c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  u s i n g  o n e  b a s i c  h e l i c o p t e r  d e s i g n .   T h e  l i g h t  u t i l i t y  v a r i a n t  w a s  e l i m i n a t e d  i n  
1 9 8 8  d u e  t o  b u d g e t  c o s t s .   ( D o u g l a s  W .  N e l m s ,  “ L H X  a n d  t h e  A r m y  M o d e r n i z a t i o n  P l a n , ”  N a t i o n a l  
D e f e n s e ,  S e p  8 9 ,  p .  3 8 . )  
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future,  i t  was inevitable that LUH funding would be either reduced or 
eliminated.  Litt le thought was given to the impact ARI would have on 
util i ty helicopter assets in both the Army and the ARNG. 
Studies conducted in 1994 by the USAAVNC Directorate of Combat 
Development (DCD) eliminated a COTS design option for the LUH 
airframe because of i ts  cost .   DCD planners ,  however,  were not  given 
adequate t ime to thoroughly examine all  potential  modernization designs.  
Abandoning the COTS airframe allowed DCD personnel to complete their  
hurried analyses within the mandated 30-day period.   Alternat ive 
solutions to LUH mo dernization opened the door for more defense 
interests  to get  involved in the decision-making.  Defense contractors 
competing to upgrade the UH -1 with digit ized systems helped to prolong 
the entire modernization effort .    
Over  several  years  no clear  consensus was reached on a LUH design 
option.   Officials  decided that  the ARNG would receive al l  four exist ing 
UH-1 helicopter  bat tal ions as a temporary measure,  unti l  an acceptable 
replacement design could be budgeted through the DTLOMS process.   
This  long period of  indecisiveness and inact ion al lowed other  factors  to 
come into play, and eroded UH -1 upgrade feasibil i ty.   The vague guidance 
for a future LUH force structure offered in Army modernization plans 
throughout the 1990s did nothing to assist  the decision makers.   
In retrospect ,  ARI goals and objectives needed rethinking once i t  
became apparent that modernization funds would be inadequate.   The 
Army was fixated on moving forward with the Comanche program, and 
was unwill ing to modify i ts  plans based on f isca l  rea l i t ies .   I t  was  
inevitable that  other aviation modernization efforts would suffer at  the 
expense of Comanche.   Even when i t  was clear there would be no more 
money for other programs, however,  the Army continued to avoid realist ic 
planning for the worst  possible  budgetary scenario.   The two appropriate  
options were either to fund the LUH force according to original 
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modernization planning, or to eliminate i t  altogether.   Austere budgets 
and shift ing conditions make t imely decisions and program flexibil i ty 
indispensable for  long- range planning.  
B. FORCE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: DTLOMS  
The DTLOMS process demands a clear roadmap for force structure 
determination and development.   Poli t ical  and budgetary considerations 
should not circumvent a thorough analysis of  doctr ine,  t raining,  leader 
development,  organization,  material ,  and soldier requirements.   In the 
event,  analysts  bypassed several  s teps in the DTLOMS process,  result ing 
in the interim LUH decision, on the assumption that problems could be 
resolved la ter .   Both the doctrine and material  solutions portions of the 
analysis circumvented normal DTLOMS staffing procedures.  This failure 
to follow doctrine meant that the final decision on the LUH was made 
without full  information about the LUH force structure and i t s  capabi l i t ies  
on the batt lefield.   Even after  the f irst  LUH battal ions were fielded in the 
ARNG, division and corps commanders and their  s taffs  were unaware of 
their existence because doctrinal publications made no mention of them. 43   
A mater ial  solut ion- - the approval of the LUH ORD by DCSOPS--
also remained problematic.   DCSOPS approval would have made the LUH 
program eligible to compete against  Comanche for existing aviation 
procurement funds.  As long as the ORD remained incomplete or i ts  
approval  w as delayed,  funding for a COTS aircraft  design or an upgraded 
UH-1 with a T800 engine would not be forthcoming. The DTLOMS and 
ORD process,  delayed due to internal  s taff ing and decision-making 
problems,  lasted for  approximately f ive years .44   TRADOC pressured the 
Army to eliminate the LUH due to the cost of modernizing the aging UH -1 
                                                 
43  A l b e r t  P a t t e r s o n ,  I n t e r v i e w  b y  a u t h o r ,  E n t e r p r i s e ,  P a . ,  1 2  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 0 .  
44  I n f o r m a t i o n  o n  t h e  e x a c t  d a t e  o f  O R D  i n i t i a t i o n  w a s  n o t  a v a i l a b l e .   T h e  e s t i m a t e  w a s  b a s e d  o n  a  
D C D  m e m o r a n d u m  d i r e c t i n g  a  r e v i e w  o f  t h e  m i s s i o n  n e e d s  s t a t e m e n t  ( M N S )  f o r  t h e  L U H .  T h e  M N S  i s  
n o r m a l l y  c o m p l e t e d  j u s t  p r i o r  t o  t h e  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  t h e  O R D  p r o c e s s . 
 38 
fleet. 45  Even as the 2000 Army Modernization Plan that eliminated LUH 
from the future Army was published, the ORD sti l l  had not been approved.  
C. INCOMPATIBLE GOALS OF THE ARMY AND ARMY 
NATIONAL GUARD 
 
The Army and ARNG have incompatible goals for uti l i ty helicopter 
modernization.  Successive Army aviation modernization plans have 
demonstrated that Comanche takes priority over the LUH.  The goal of the 
ARNG, by contrast,  is to ma intain i ts  aviat ion force primari ly to support  
s tate disaster  rel ief .   I f  the ARNG is  mobil ized,  however,  i t  a lso must  be 
prepared for  corps and divis ion level  wart ime operat ions.   The fact  that  i t  
st i l l  depends on legacy aircraft  such as the UH -1, AH-1,  and OH-58 
airframes puts the Guard at  least  a full  generation behind the active 
component.  The plan to upgrade UH -1 with a T800 engine was not 
considered a feasible option.  Theater  commanders- in-chief  (CINCs) were 
not interested in employing outdated aircraft,  nor did an upgraded UH -1 
make an adequate substitute for new aircraft  designed for the LUH 
mission. 46   At present,  Comanche also does not meet the state and wartime 
mission requirements of the ARNG. 
ARI set the stage for development of incompatible Ar my-ARNG 
goals and objectives.   Planners did not fully assess the impact of ARI on 
the reserve component,  nor did they correctly anticipate the effect  budget 
reductions would have on modernization.  The ARNG agreed to sign on 
with ARI only after  i t  was decided that the LUH force structure would be 
given to the Guard.47   
                                                 
45  C o r b i t t  G a m b l e ,  T e l e p h o n e  i n t e r v i e w  b y  a u t h o r ,  F o r t  R u c k e r ,  A l . ,  2 8  J a n u a r y  2 0 0 0 .  
46  J o h n  B a r n e s ,  S e n a t e  A r m e d  S e r v i c e s  C o m m i t t e e ,  I n t e r v i e w  b y  a u t h o r ,  W a s h i n g t o n ,  D C . ,  4  J a n u a r y  
2000 .  
47  C o r b i t t  G a m b l e ,  T e l e p h o n e  i n t e r v i e w  b y  a u t h o r ,  F o r t  R u c k e r ,  A l . ,  2 8  J a n u a r y  2 0 0 0 . 
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ARNG uti l i ty hel icopter  assets  at  the bat tal ion level  t radit ionally 
are distr ibuted over s tate  boundaries .   This  al lows the s tate  adjutant  
generals and supporting staff  directorates to influe nce or  shape aviat ion 
policies within their  state.   With the introduction of the ARI, states began 
to compete against  one another for ut i l i ty helicopter  resources.   Despite 
the importance of continued modernization, maintaining the existing 
uti l i ty helicopter  force structure took precedence over other needs.  
The regular Army did not experience the same draw down as the 
ARNG.  The cutbacks forced by ARI stymied any effort to formulate a 
sound helicopter modernization strategy for both Army components.   
Future planning for modernization must take into account the needs of 
each component.   Incompatible goals  and objectives wil l  only serve to 
delay decision making, as we have seen in the current implementation of 
an inadequate LUH program.  
D.   POLITICAL INFLUENCES ON LUH 
The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) had l i t t le  direct  
impact on LUH-related decisions.   Senators  and their  professional  s taff  
did,  however,  let  the Army know what sort  of a modernization plan would 
be  acceptable .   For  severa l  years  pr ior  to the introduction of the MFB 
force structure,  Congress had been asking for a sound modernization plan 
from the Army.  The senators’ main criticism of Army plans was that they 
contained too many costly programs (e.g. ,  Comanche) for the available 
budget.  If the Army had presented a sound plan for the LUH structure and 
airframe design,  with a detai led just if icat ion of  i ts  bat t lef ield need,  the  
SASC likely would have supported i t .   
Although DOD advisory committee members historically have close 
t ies  to industry and finance,  research for this  paper uncovered no l ink 
between advisory committees and the LUH force structure decision-
making process.   
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E.   CONSIDERATIONS 
As previously mentioned,  periods characterized by austere defense 
budgets  require a  certain degree of planning flexibil i ty when developing 
future aviation modernization plans.  Plan flexibil i ty and the abil i ty to 
integrate change must be ingredients to any modernization plan 
formulated in the post-Cold War period.  Aviat ion planners  and decis ion-
makers must  be wil l ing and able to modify plans based on f iscal  real i t ies ,  
emerging threats,  and as a result  of new factors impacting modernization 
ini t iat ives.  This could include an accelerated procurement and f ielding of 
a  part icular  type of  airframe based on need,  or as a consequence of 
unanticipated problems with the older fleet of aircraft .  The unfunded LUH 
and the aging UH-1 f leet  is  a  case in point .  However immediate the need,  
a si tuation involving accelerated procurement should be compatible with 
the long- range objectives of any modernization plan.  Plan f lexibil i ty also 
should allow for the modification of long- range object ives  i f  warranted.   
DTLOMS as part of the Army procurement process tends to function 
effectively when properly implemented in acquisi tion of new combat 
systems. The Army’s helicopter procurement process is  no exception.   
When part icular steps are bypassed in the DTLOMS process,  combat 
system procurement can become problematic.  Continual delays in 
dec is ion-making or staffing actions can have a negative influence on  
system procurement.  This includes increased susceptibil i ty to unforeseen 
events,  influences,  or  circumstances.   
The Army and ARNG have incompatible goals for uti l i ty helicopter 
modernization.  Any future plan must take into account the requirements 
of the Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve. The 
fielding of modernized helicopter airframes to both the Guard and Regular 
Army simultaneously will  establish a common ground where cooperative 
efforts  can be cult ivated among the three components. Common goals, 
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object ives,  and priori t ies  can then be established.  This would include,  but  
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